His answer on PIP. Delray Beach, September 2, 2026.
Florida has been studying it since 1972.
Fifty-four years. Five filed repeal attempts. One bill that reached the Governor's desk and was vetoed. And a state regulator publishing rate filings that show Florida auto premiums falling right now — down 6.5% in 2025 and 8% so far in 2026 — under the very system repeal would eliminate. The studies exist. The question is whether anyone will read them before Florida drivers pay for the answer.
Every argument for repeal has been made before. Every warning against it has been made before. Nothing about the underlying problem has changed, and nothing about the proposed fix has changed either. Here is the actual record.
Florida adopts no-fault. Drivers carry Personal Injury Protection so medical bills get paid fast, regardless of who caused the crash. The $10,000 minimum has never been raised.
Repeal legislation filed and dies. Then-Rep. Erin Grall is among the sponsors.
The one that got through — and was stopped. SB 54 passed both chambers. Governor DeSantis vetoed it, warning it did not adequately address the problem it claimed to solve and could raise costs on Florida drivers.
Repeal filed again. Fails again. In 2023, SB 464 never moves out of committee.
HB 1181 (Reps. Alvarez and Weinberger) and SB 1256 (Sen. Grall). The House bill clears two of three committees. The Senate companion is never heard. Both die.
HB 769 (Rep. Weinberger) and SB 522 (Sen. Grall) — the fifth combined attempt. Neither receives a floor vote in either chamber. The session adjourns March 13, 2026 with PIP still the law.
The next session convenes. Repeal has been filed in consecutive sessions for a decade. Expect it back. The difference this time is that Florida will have a new Governor deciding whether to sign it.
This is the part of the argument that repeal supporters have to answer and so far have not. The Office of Insurance Regulation publishes what Florida's five largest auto insurance groups — roughly 78% of the market — are filing for. Here is the trend.
Average indicated rate change, Florida's top five auto writer groups. Source: Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. The 2026 figure is year-to-date as of February 2026; one group indicated as much as −16.5%.
of Florida auto policyholders seeing lower rates for 2026, per the Insurance Commissioner
personal auto liability loss ratio in 2025 — the lowest in Florida in 15 years, and first in the nation
vehicle damage loss ratio in 2025, down from 112% in 2022
companies filed auto rate cuts in a single year, including State Farm, Progressive, GEICO, USAA, Allstate and AAA
Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, Inc. · Commissioned by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation · Released June 14, 2021
This is the study. It already exists. The state paid for it, an independent actuarial firm wrote it, and it was delivered on June 14, 2021 — while SB 54, the last successful PIP repeal, was sitting on Governor DeSantis's desk awaiting his signature. Lead author Roosevelt Mosley Jr. ran 185 pages of company-level data to answer one question: what happens to premiums if Florida repeals PIP and mandates bodily injury coverage instead?
The answer was not ambiguous.
Two weeks later, Governor DeSantis vetoed SB 54. He acknowledged the no-fault system has real flaws and that Florida's bad-faith law is deficient, but concluded the bill did not adequately address the current issues facing Florida drivers
and could carry unintended consequences for the market and for consumers. That veto was not a hunch. It followed a study the state itself had ordered.
Now the part nobody running this bill wants discussed: the Legislature's own staff analysis of HB 1181 confirms that OIR has commissioned no study at all on what the current repeal bills would do to premiums. The last time Florida actually measured this, the answer was that rates go up. Since then the sponsors have refiled four more times without ordering a new measurement — and the current bills drop the medical payments coverage that SB 54 at least included.
That is the standard, and he set it himself. When this administration claimed the reforms were working, it pointed at Office of Insurance Regulation data that anyone could check: rate filings, loss ratios, litigation volume, refunds and dividends returned to policyholders. State Farm has cut rates three times since 2024, more than 20% in total, and returned a dividend averaging $173 per vehicle. Progressive filed an 8% decrease and refunded over $1 billion. These are documents, not talking points.
So the question for anyone proposing to repeal PIP in 2027 is not whether the current system is perfect. It plainly is not. The question is narrower and much harder: where is the equivalent filing-level evidence that repeal makes this curve keep going down?
Nobody has produced it. Not in 2017, not in 2021, not in 2025, not in 2026. The one independent actuarial study Florida actually commissioned found the opposite — premiums up 13.3% overall, and up to 77.2% for the drivers who can least afford it. If a better analysis exists, publish it and we will link to it here without editing a word.
Until then, the burden sits with repeal. You do not get to dismantle a system that is currently producing an 8% rate decrease on the strength of a promise, when the last Governor was held to the standard of proof — and met it.
Follow the mechanism. Not a theory, not an accusation — the plain text of what the bill does, as described by the Legislature's own staff analysis.
Florida Statute 627.737 sets a threshold. You can only recover non-economic damages — pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience — if the injury involves permanent loss of an important bodily function, permanent injury, significant permanent scarring, or death. Below that line, a crash is a medical claim. Above it, a crash becomes a lawsuit.
The House staff analysis of HB 1181 states it directly: repealing PIP eliminates the tort liability limitation, so an injured person could sue the at-fault driver for any damages sustained regardless of the seriousness of the injury. The bill removes the conditional exclusion of non-economic damages and permits punitive damages awards. Every fender-bender becomes a potential pain-and-suffering claim.
Under the current threshold, a surgical procedure is the most dependable way to establish permanent injury and unlock non-economic damages. After repeal there is no threshold at all — but surgery still does the other job it has always done in an injury claim: it multiplies the settlement value. Documented operative findings, hardware, scarring and a surgeon's permanency opinion turn a modest soft-tissue claim into a large one.
That is the whole engine. Remove the medical gatekeeper, remove the threshold, and you have converted a system that pays medical bills quickly into a system that generates lawsuits — where the size of the payout rises with the number of procedures performed. The people who do well under that arrangement are bodily-injury firms, high-volume surgical practices, and the litigation-funded medical networks that connect them. Florida drivers are not on that list. They are the ones writing the premium check.
We are not going to repeat unverified claims about any legislator's family or private finances. This page does not traffic in that. But there is a legitimate standard question, and it applies to every member equally:
If a legislator has a financial relationship — employment, ownership, income, or significant campaign support — with a trial firm, a surgical practice, or a litigation-driven medical network that would profit from mandatory bodily injury coverage, should that legislator be sponsoring the bill?
Florida already has the tools to answer this. Every member files a Form 6 full and public disclosure of financial interests, naming employers and sources of income. Every contribution is reported to the Division of Elections. Both are public records, and both are searchable today.
So the ask is simple, and it is the same ask we make of the Governor's race. Rep. Weinberger and Sen. Grall should state plainly, on the record, whether they or their immediate families derive income from any entity that stands to gain from repeal — and if the answer is yes, they should say why recusal is not warranted. Sen. Grall has already acknowledged that her legal practice in catastrophic injury and collision cases informs her work on this bill. That is a start. Voters deserve the complete picture from both sponsors before the 2027 session, not after the bill has moved.
Disclosure is not an accusation. It is the cheapest thing an elected official can offer, and refusing it is the only thing that would make any of this look worse than it does.
At a campaign stop in Delray Beach on September 2 — 62 days before the election — the Republican nominee said he had not decided the future of PIP coverage and would study the auto insurance market the way he intends to study homeowners. That is a fair answer in January of a first term. It is a thin answer from someone who chaired the Florida House Insurance and Banking Subcommittee and who may have a repeal bill on his desk within four months of taking office.
We are not asking him to take our side. We are asking him to answer.
It is called The Impact of Repealing Personal Injury Protection Coverage in Florida, by Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, ordered by the Office of Insurance Regulation and delivered June 14, 2021. It found premiums rise 13.3% overall and as much as 77.2% for minimum-coverage drivers. Governor DeSantis read it and vetoed the bill. The rate filings since then are public too. Name the document you have not yet read, and name the date you will have read it.
Governor DeSantis vetoed this exact policy and endorsed you on September 1. You have run on continuing his record. Would you have signed SB 54? A candidate can continue a record or reverse it, but not both quietly.
PIP is not just a payment mechanism. It is the point where someone independent decides whether continued treatment is medically necessary. Remove it without a replacement and that decision moves to the courtroom. Name the gatekeeper you would put in its place.
Repeal is worth a great deal of money to bodily-injury firms and to litigation-driven medical networks. It is worth money to insurers on the other side. Both sets of checks are public record. Publish what your campaign and your affiliated committees have received from each, and let Florida drivers weigh it themselves. We are not alleging anything here. We are asking for disclosure, which is the cheapest thing any candidate can offer and the fastest way to end a rumor.
Governor DeSantis did not ask Floridians to take his word that rates would fall. He put the filings on the table. If a repeal bill reaches your desk in 2027, will you require its sponsors to produce actuarial evidence that rates keep declining after repeal — before you sign, not after? And will you commit now that you will not sign any repeal that lacks an independent medical necessity determination to replace the gatekeeper you would be removing?
Repeal without a replacement and without proof is not reform. It is an undo button on a market that is currently working.
We do not care which one the Legislature and the Governor choose. We care that whichever one they choose has a medical safeguard in it. Everything below works under either.
PIP was built to get medical care paid quickly after a crash while holding down lawsuits and keeping costs predictable. It largely does that. What it does badly is police itself.
The abuse is not mysterious. It runs through paper-only determinations, evaluators with a financial stake in the outcome, treatment that continues without anyone checking whether it should, and justifications written after the billing.
Modernizes PIP without repealing it, and restores the basic trust that medical decisions are being driven by medicine rather than by billing.
The Legislature has the authority to repeal. That is a legitimate policy choice and we do not contest it.
What Florida drivers cannot afford is repeal with nothing in its place. Take away the medical gatekeeper and disputes do not disappear — they relocate to litigation, where they cost more and take years.
Keeps access to care while establishing medical truth before money, which is what prevents both runaway costs and endless disputes.
Two paths. One standard: medical integrity and consumer protection.
This was drafted for the 2026 session and did not get filed before the deadline. It is published here so that no one in 2027 can say a workable alternative was never on the table. It is short, it is neutral, and it is available to any member who wants to file it.
Section __. Independent Medical Necessity Determination; Reimbursement Safeguards.
(1) Legislative Purpose and Intent. The Legislature finds that following repeal of Personal Injury Protection (PIP), Florida motorists require a neutral, medically grounded safeguard to ensure that determinations of injury severity and continued medical necessity are made by independent medical professionals rather than by treating providers with financial interests or by insurers through non-clinical review processes. This section establishes an Independent Medical Necessity Determination to protect consumers from unnecessary or prolonged treatment; prevent paper-only claim denials; reduce litigation escalation; and provide cost predictability without limiting access to medical care. Nothing in this section authorizes an insurer to order, direct, or control medical treatment.
(2) Definitions. (a) "Independent Medical Necessity Determination" or "IMND" means a medical evaluation conducted by a qualified, independent medical professional solely to determine injury severity and whether continued treatment is medically necessary for reimbursement purposes. (b) "Initial course of care" means treatment rendered within the first 30 days following the motor vehicle accident or the first 12 treatment visits, whichever occurs first. (c) "Independent medical determination" means a written medical finding resulting from an Independent Medical Necessity Determination.
(3) Requirement by Operation of Law. An Independent Medical Necessity Determination is required by operation of law, and not by insurer request or prescription, when: (a) Treatment extends beyond the initial course of care; or (b) Injury severity, threshold injury status, or continued medical necessity is disputed for reimbursement purposes.
(4) Authorized Evaluators and Method of Examination. (a) An IMND may be performed by a physician licensed under chapter 458 or 459, Florida Statutes; a physician assistant licensed under chapter 458 or 459; or an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 464. (b) The determination may be conducted in person or via telemedicine as defined in s. 456.47, Florida Statutes. (c) The evaluating professional must have no financial, employment, referral, or treatment relationship with the treating provider whose care is under review or with the claimant.
(5) Initiation. An IMND may be initiated by the claimant; by a treating provider other than the provider rendering ongoing care; or by operation of law when reimbursement beyond the initial course of care is sought. An insurer may not order, prescribe, select, or compel an Independent Medical Necessity Determination.
(6) Nature and Scope. (a) The IMND is limited to determining injury severity and whether continued treatment is medically necessary for reimbursement purposes. (b) The determination does not constitute treatment or ongoing care; does not establish a provider-patient relationship for treatment purposes; and is an independent medical claims safeguard only. (c) Peer review, utilization review, record review, or paper-only review does not satisfy the IMND requirement.
(7) Compensation. (a) Total compensation for an IMND shall not exceed $300, which constitutes the maximum allowable and exclusive charge, inclusive of all professional, administrative, technical, telemedicine, record review, and reporting services. (b) The fee shall be paid directly by the insurer; shall not be billed to the insured or claimant; shall not be subject to balance billing; and shall not reduce policy limits or claimant benefits. (c) No additional compensation may be sought under any other provision of law or legal theory.
(8) Effect on Reimbursement. (a) If an IMND finds that continued treatment is not medically necessary, no insurer is required to reimburse for treatment rendered after the date of the determination, regardless of provider type. (b) For reimbursement purposes, chiropractic, rehabilitative, or passive therapy services rendered after a finding of no medical necessity are non-compensable, unless a subsequent independent medical determination establishes continued necessity.
(9) Absence of Independent Medical Determination. (a) In the absence of an IMND establishing continued medical necessity, reimbursement is not required for treatment rendered after the initial course of care. (b) A treating provider's own determination of medical necessity does not establish reimbursement eligibility beyond the initial course of care. (c) Treatment may continue at the election of the claimant; however, reimbursement is limited to services rendered prior to satisfaction of this section.
(10) Prohibited Conduct. (a) A treating provider may not condition care on the outcome of an IMND. (b) An evaluating professional or entity may not be compensated based on claim outcome, volume, or coverage determination. (c) A treating provider may not extend or continue treatment for reimbursement purposes based solely on the provider's own medical necessity determination following a finding to the contrary. (d) Treatment records, affidavits, or opinions generated after a finding of no medical necessity may not be used to establish retroactive reimbursement eligibility, absent a new qualifying medical event.
(11) Rule of Construction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit access to medical care; restrict a claimant's right to contest liability or damages; authorize insurers to direct or control medical treatment; or convert an IMND into a treating medical service.
(12) Applicability. This section applies to all motor vehicle accident claims arising on or after the effective date of this act.
We are not making allegations about anyone's private life or family. We are pointing at the public legislative record, which is enough.
House District 94
Co-sponsored HB 1181 in 2025 and carried HB 769 in 2026. Both would have ended the PIP requirement and replaced it with mandatory bodily-injury coverage. Neither included an independent medical necessity safeguard.
The open question for 2027 is straightforward: will the next version include one?
Senate District 29
Has filed or co-sponsored repeal in 2017, 2021, 2023, 2025 and 2026 — the longest-running push of its kind in the Legislature. She is also a practicing attorney whose work focuses on catastrophic injury and vehicle collision cases, and she has said publicly that this gives her unique knowledge and perspective in this area of law
.
That is her own description, not ours. Voters can decide whether a decade of persistence on a bill that repeatedly failed reflects conviction, expertise, or interest. All three are possible. The record is what it is.
Neither sponsor has produced an actuarial analysis showing that repeal lowers what Florida drivers pay. The only independent study the state ever commissioned — Pinnacle's June 2021 report for OIR — found premiums would rise. Across four refilings since, neither sponsor has asked OIR for a new one. The Legislature's own staff analysis of HB 1181 says so plainly. If a study supporting repeal exists, publish it. We will link to it here without editing a word.
These were made during the last serious repeal push. Watch them and note how little has changed about either the promises or the gaps.
The prior attempt to repeal PIP, and the consumer-protection concerns that stopped it.
What removing the no-fault system without safeguards actually does to costs and litigation.
Keep PIP or repeal it. But do not remove the medical gatekeeper and leave Florida drivers with nothing in its place.